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A Test for Appealability: The Final Judgment Rule
and Closure Orders
I. INTRODUCTION
The timing of an appeal from a state or federal trial court
order is usually governed by some form of the 'fnal judgment
rule": appeals may be heard only from orders "that '[end] the
litigation on the merits and [leave] nothing for the court to do
but execute the judgment.' "1 This general rule is subject to a
number of exceptions, 2 which are designed to allow immediate
appeal of interlocutory trial court orders when the disadvan-
tages of piecemeal review are outweighed by the need for im-
mediate review of trial court decisions.3 Appellate courts have
adopted several different approaches to the application of the
final judgment rule and its exceptions, resulting in inefficient
1. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 101 S. Ct. 669, 673 (1981) (quot-
ing Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467 (1978) (quoting Catlin v.
United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945))); see 9 J. MOORE FEDERAL PRACTICE
110.06, at 105 (2d ed. 1980). The federal final judgment rule was originally en-
acted as part of the 1789 Federal Judiciary Act and is now codified in section
1291 of the United States Judicial Code:
The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final
decisions of the district courts of the United States, the United States
District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of
Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, except where a di-
rect review may be had in the Supreme Court.
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). Most states have similar provisions. See, e.g., CAl PE-
NAL CODE § 1466 (West 1970); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 29.02(2) (1), (2).
2. The United States Supreme Court has refrained from referring to those
instances in which it has not applied the final judgment rule as "exceptions" to
the rule; rather, the Court has stated that it has merely made a determination
of "finality." See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546
(1949) (section 1291 has long been given a "practical rather than a technical
construction"); Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 203 (1848) ("this Court
has not heretofore understood the words 'final decrees' in [the] strict and tech-
nical sense, but has given to them a more liberal, and, as we think, a more rea-
sonable construction, and one more consonant to the intention of the
legislature"). Commentators have nevertheless agreed that these doctrines are
more accurately described as "exceptions" to the final judgment rule than as
definitions of what is "final." See, e.g., 9 J. MOORE FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra
note 1, 1 110.10, at 130; Redish, The Pragmatic Approach to Appealability in the
Federal Courts, 75 COLum. L. REV. 89, 90 (1975).
3. See notes 11-21, 92-140 infra and accompanying text. For an example of
the harm strict adherence to the final judgment rule can cause, see Redish,
supra note 2, at 99-100 (discussing Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513 (1956)).
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use of judicial resources and inadequate protection of the vari-
ous interests involved.
These differences are evident in the development of the
law with respect to motions to close criminal proceedings to the
public, a procedural maneuver that has received great attention
since the United States Supreme Court has indicated its will-
ingness to limit public access to various stages of a criminal
proceeding 4 In judging the appealability of orders in regard to
such motions, some courts have steadfastly adhered to the final
judgment rule and have refused to hear the appeal until trial's
end,5 others have immediately heard the appeal under an ex-
ception to the final judgment rule,6 and one has decided the is-
sue under a test purporting to balance the competing policy
interests.7 Whether an appeal from a trial court order granting
or denying a motion to close a criminal proceeding is subject to
immediate appellate review affects several major interests: the
defendant's interest in a fair and speedy trial, the government's
interest in preserving judicial resources, and the public's inter-
est in open proceedings.
This Note reviews the final judgment rule and its excep-
tions, and examines how the exceptions have been applied in
cases in which litigants appeal from interlocutory orders such
as those granting or denying motions to close criminal proceed-
4. In Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), the trial judge in
a sensational murder case prohibited only release of accounts of events that
transpired in the courtroom at the preliminary hearing. The Supreme Court
ruled that the order was an impermissible prior restraint on the media's first
amendment rights, but indicated that instead of "gagging" the press, the trial
court could have closed the preliminary hearing to the press and the public.
427 U.S. at 564 n.8, 568. In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), the
Court upheld the closure of a pretrial suppression hearing to the press and the
public in a murder case when the purpose of the closure was to limit poten-
tially prejudicial pretrial publicity. The Court found that neither the press nor
the public has a constitutional right to attend the pretrial hearings. 443 U.S. at
387.
According to the Reporter's Committee for Freedom of the Press, 300 mo-
tions have been made to close criminal proceedings since Gannett Co. v. DePas-
quale was decided on July 2, 1979. See Court Watch Summary, NEws MEDIA &
L., Oct.-Nov. 1980, at 34. For a summary of those efforts, see id. See United
States v. Powers, 622 F.2d 317, 320 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 112 (1980)
(immediate appeal allowed partially "because of the fallout from the Gannett
case and the proliferation of cases coming on line dealing with the issue of clo-
sure"); New York v. Wright, 5 MEDIA L. RPTr [BNA] 1372, 1372 (N.Y. 1979)
(court implied that closure was requested because of the Gannett decision,
which was decided only days before).
5. See note 10 infra and accompanying text.
6. See notes 14-15, 19-21 infra and accompanying text.
7. See United States v. Powers, 622 F.2d 317 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S.
Ct. 112 (1980); notes 32-38 infra and accompanying text.
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ings to the public.8 After demonstrating the problems with the
traditional approach, this Note examines alternative pragmatic
balancing approaches, and proposes a test based upon the sali-
ent factors underlying the final judgment rule and its tradi-
tional exceptions is proposed. The Note concludes by applying
this analytically consistent test to the various contexts in which
orders respecting closure motions can result in requests for im-
mediate appellate review.
II. APPEALABILITY OF CLOSURE ORDERS UNDER
PRESENT DOCTRINE
A. THE FIAL JUDGMENT RULE AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
The final judgment rule's prohibition against appeals from
trial court orders that do not end the litigation on the merits is
derived primarily from the interest in judicial economy and the
belief that better appellate decision making results from the re-
view of only those issues that are "ripe" for appeal.9 Absent an
exception, the rule clearly controls appeals from orders regard-
ing closure motions since under the rule such orders are in
no way final. Thus, appellate courts refusing to hear immediate
appeals from orders regarding closure motions have typically
8.* Suppression of evidence hearings are the most common closed pre-
trial hearings. See, e.g., Gannet Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 375 (1979); Phil-
adelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, 478 Pa. 484, 490, 387 A.2d 425, 428 (1978),
dismissed, 443 U.S. 913 (1979); State ex rel. Feeney v. District Court, 607 P.2d
1259, 1261 (Wyo. 1980). In some cases, voir dire of potential jurors has been
closed. See, e.g., Commercial Printing Co. v. Lee, 262 Ark. 87, 89, 553 S.W.2d 270,
271 (1977); Great Falls Tribune v. District Court, 608 P.2d 116, 117 (Mont. 1980);
Rapid City Journal Co. v. Circuit Court, 283 N.W.2d 563, 565 (S.D. 1979). Other
cases have involved closure of portions of the trial, for example, when there is a
perceived need to protect a testifying witness, or the whole trial See, e.g., Rich-
mond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814, 2816 (1980); United States v.
Powers, 622 F.2d 317, 319 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 112 (1980); Oliver v.
Postel, 30 N.Y.2d 171, 176, 282 N.E.2d 306, 307, 331 N.Y.S.2d 407, 409 (1972). At
least one attempt has been made to close a post-trial sentencing proceeding in
order to prevent injury to the defendant's case pending in a neighboring juris-
diction. See United States v. Fiumara, 605 F.2d 116, 117 (3d Cir. 1979). One
court has entertained a motion to close a post-conviction habeas corpus hear-
ing, see Houston Chronicle v. McMaster, 598 S.W.2d 864, 865 (Tex. Crim. App.
1980) (en banc), and another has heard a motion to close a post-trial hearing to
set aside a guilty verdict, see Gannett Co. v. Mark, 54 A.D.2d 818, 818, 387
N.Y.S.2d 336, 338 (1976).
9. See generally 9 J. MOORE, supra note 1, 1 110.06-.07, at 106-111; C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDIC-
TION § 3907, at 429-35 (1976). See also Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S.
463, 473 (1978); Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233-34 (1945); Cobbledick v.
United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940); Note, Interlocutory Appeals in the Fed-
eral Courts Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), 88 HARv. L. REV. 607, 610 (1975).
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done so under the final judgment rule and its underlying
rationales.O
A number of exceptions to the basic requirement of finality
have been developed to alleviate some of the problems and in-
justices that can occur as a result of the strict application of the
final judgment rule." The classic exception to the final judg-
ment rule is the "collateral order" or "irreparable harm" doc-
trine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.12
Interlocutory orders may be immediately appealed under this
doctrine if they concern issues that are essentially unrelated to
the issues of the main dispute, are themselves final and conclu-
sive, and involve a right that will probably be irreparably lost if
review is delayed.13 In the context of closure orders, for exam-
ple, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that it could hear
an appeal of several members of the news media from a district
court order closing a pretrial suppression hearing and sealing
the record.14 The court noted that the order "constituted a final
decision since it determined a matter independent of the issues
to be resolved in the criminal proceeding itself, bound persons
10. See, e.g., United States v. Powers, 622 F.2d 317, 320 n.2 (8th Cir.) (court
expressed "grave doubts concerning the appealability of interlocutory orders
regarding closure of criminal trials to the public"), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 112
(1980); United States v. Fiumara, 605 F.2d 116, 118 (3d Cir. 1979) (a decision de-
nying closed trial not immediately appealable because not final and did not
meet requirements of exceptions to final judgment rule); State ex rel Feeney v.
District Court, 607 P.2d 1259 (Wyo. 1980) (closure orders are within trial court's
discretion, and thus not appealable).
11. See C. WRIGnT, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 101, at 504 (3d ed. 1976); 9 J.
MOORE FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 1, 11 110.06-.08(1), at 105-118, T 110.26, at
276. See also Frank, Requiem for the Final Judgment Rule, 45 TEx. L. REV. 292
(1966).
12. 337 U.S. 541 (1949). In Cohen, the Supreme Court affirmed the Third
Circuit Court of Appeal's exercise of jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the
trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to require the plaintiff to post
bond for expenses in a shareholder derivative suit. The Court reasoned that
immediate appeals should be granted from orders that are 'Tinal" in that they
will not be subsequently changed by the trial court and will not be merged with
the final judgment. Id. at 546.
13. Id. See Note, The Appealability of Orders Denying Motions for Dis-
qualification of Counsel in the Federal Courts, 45 U. Cm L. REV. 450, 454-55
(1978). Whether an unsettled question is still a requirement is doubtful. See
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 101 S. Ct. 669, 674 (1981) (the order must
only "conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue
completely separate from the merits of the action, and be effectively unreview-
able on appeal from a final judgment") (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)); Redish, supra note 2, at 112; Comment, Appealability
of Refusals to Approve Proposed Title VII Consent Decrees: Carson v. Ameri-
can Brands, Inc., 64 MIN. L. REV. 1300, 1303 n.20 (1980). The Supreme Court
has invoked the Cohen exception for orders denying motions to reduce bail, see
Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 3 (1951), and for motions to dismiss an indictment on
double jeopardy grounds, see Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
14. See United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 845 (3d Cir. 1978).
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who were non-parties in the underlying criminal proceeding
and had a substantial, continuing effect on important rights."'5
Many state courts have used this "irreparable harm" ra-
tionale to justify immediate review of closure orders under ex-
traordinary writs such as mandamus and prohibition,16 but in
the federal courts, the use of extraordinary writs may be more
questionable. Despite the Supreme Court's general expansion
of the availability of mandamus as a vehicle for interlocutory
appellate review in cases involving a need for the "supervisory
and advisory" power of the appellate courts,'7 the Court has
15. Id. (quoting United States v. Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1, 5 (3d Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974)).
16. See, e.g., Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Jennings, 107 Ariz. 557, 561, 490
P.2d 563, 567 (1971) (prohibition); Commercial Printing Co. v. Lee, 262 Ark. 87,
93, 553 S.W.2d 270, 272 (1977) (mandamus); Gannett Pac. Corp. v. Richardson, 59
Hawaii 224, 227, 580 P.2d 49, 53 (1978) (prohibition); Hansen v. Kelly, 37 A.D.2d
617, 617, 325 N.Y.S.2d 276, 277 (mandamus), appeal after remand, 38 A.D.2d 722,
329 N.Y.S.2d 609 (1971); State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 46
Ohio St. 2d 457, 490, 351 N.E.2d 127, 146 (1976) (prohibition). But see Philadel-
phia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, 478 Pa. 484, 490, 387 A.2d 425, 430 (1978) (refus-
ing to grant prohibition or mandamus), diswnissed, 443 U.S. 913 (1979). For
cases in which other extraordinary writs have been employed, see note 21 in-
fra.
Extraordinary writs are codified at the federal level in the All Writs Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1976), and at the state level in a variety of similar provisions.
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1084, 1102 (West 1980); MIEN. STAT. § 586.01
(1980). Though technically not an appeal, the effect of an extraordinary writ is
ultimately the same as an appeal.
17. The use of mandamus was traditionally allowed "only 'to confine an in-
ferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to
exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so."' Allied Chem. Corp. v.
Daiflon, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 188, 190 (1980) (quoting Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90,
95 (1967) (quoting Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943))). In
two important cases, however, the Supreme Court expanded the availability of
mandamus for interlocutory appeal. In LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S.
249 (1957), the trial judge, to help clear a congested court calendar, had ordered
the referral of two complex and potentially lengthy antitrust cases to a master
under Rule 53(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. All parties objected
to the referral, and sought a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit. The Seventh Circuit granted the writ, and the Supreme
Court affirmed, stating:
We believe that supervisory control of the District Courts by the
Courts of Appeals is necessary to proper judicial administration in the
federal system. The All Writs Act confers on the Courts of Appeals the
discretionary power to issue writs of mandamus in the exceptional cir-
cumstances existing here.
352 U.S. at 259-60. This "supervisory power" has generally been interpreted to
apply to cases in which the lower court's ruling is "characteristic of an errone-
ous practice [which is] likely to reoccur." General Motors Corp. v. Lord, 488
F.2d 1096, 1099 (8th Cir. 1973); see Note, Supervisory and Advisory Mandamus
Under the All Writs Act, 86 HARV. L. REV. 595, 610 (1973). In Schlagenhauf v.
Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964), the defendant in a negligence action challenged an
order that had required him to submit to a physical examination, arguing that
his "physical and mental condition" were not "in controversy" within the
1114 [Vol. 65:1110
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not approved the use of mandamus in a criminal case "to re-
view an interlocutory procedural order... which [does] not
have the effect of a dismissal."18 In the state courts, however,
the extraordinary writs of both mandamus and prohibition
have been invoked to obtain immediate appellate review of or-
ders regarding closure motions in a variety of contexts. For ex-
ample, the Arkansas Supreme Court took jurisdiction under
mandamus to hear a newspaper's appeal from the closing of a
voir dire examination of potential jurors in a criminal case, be-
cause the press would not have had standing to appeal after
the trial;19 an Ohio appellate court approved the use of a writ of
prohibition to open a closed criminal trial when the order clos-
meaning of the rule and that good cause had not been shown for the multiple
medical examinations requested by the cross-defendant. In allowing the ap-
peal to be heard under a writ of mandamus, the Supreme Court held that man-
damus is appropriate for an "issue of first impression that [calls] for
construction and application... in a new context." Id. at 111.
18. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 98 (1967). In Will, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals invoked mandamus to compel a district court judge to vacate
a portion of a pretrial order compelling the government to turn over a list of
witnesses prior to a criminal trial. In refusing to allow the court of appeals to
issue the writ against Judge Will, the Supreme Court emphasized the ex-
traordinary nature of the writ and its traditional limited use as a remedy for
abuse of discretion by the lower courts. Id. at 95 (citing DeBeers Consol
Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 217 (1945)). The Court stated that
only exceptional circumstances "amounting to a judicial 'usurpation of power'
will justify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy," 389 U.S. at 95, and
distinguished Will from other mandamus cases on the ground that Will in-
volved the use of mandamus in a criminal proceeding, noting that "additional
considerations ... flow from the fact that the underlying proceeding is a crimi-
nal prosecution." Id. at 96. See generally Snyder, The Use of Extraordinary
Writs for Interlocutory Appeals, 44 TENN. L REV. 137, 150-51 (1976); Note, supra
note 17, at 624.
Arguably, Will should control in federal cases involving closure orders of
various kinds, since the criminal nature of the case in Will was determinative
of the Supreme Court's ruling. As articulated in Will, when the public or the
government appeals from an order closing a criminal proceeding, the policy
considerations of speedy trial and double jeopardy weigh in favor of delaying
appeal until the end of the trial. See 389 U.S. at 96. These considerations may
not apply, however, when the defendant seeks review of an order denying a
motion for closure. See note 107 infra and accompanying text. But see United
States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 862 (1978) (speedy trial is societal right, not
only right of defendant). Moreover, it has been argued that the context of Will
incited the Court's strong language. See Note, supra note 17, at 624-28. This ar-
gument is supported by the Court's entertainment of the government's request
for mandamus in a criminal case in at least one instance subsequent to Will.
See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 301 n.3 (1972)
(propriety of mandamus was not contested in the Supreme Court). Will has
had no apparent impact on the state courts' use of extraordinary writs in the
context of closure orders.
19. Commercial Printing Co. v. Lee, 262 Ark. 87, 92, 553 S.W.2d 270, 272
(1977); Star Journal Publishing Corp. v. County Court, 197 Colo. 234, 236, 591
P.2d 1028, 1029 (1979) (prohibition).
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ing the trial was clearly beyond the jurisdiction of the trial
court.20 Yet, even in the state courts, it is less than clear which
writs are most useful; state courts have recently recognized a
variety of other extraordinary writs in matters involving clo-
sure orders without discussing the appropriateness of immedi-
ate appeal or of the use of the particular writ employed.21
B. THE GILLESPIE BALANCING APPROACH
The confusion generated by the uncertain application of
the final judgment rule and its various exceptions has
prompted calls for a more straightforward approach to the ap-
pealability issue.22 The balancing test invoked by the Supreme
Court in Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp.23 represents an
attempt at such an approach. In Gillespie, the Court affirmed
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeal's immediate review of the
20. E.W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 100 Ohio App. 157, 159-60, 125 N.E.2d 896, 899
(1955).
21. See, e.g., Pechter v. Lyons, 441 F. Supp. 115, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (prelim-
inary injunction); WXIA-TV v. Devier, 5 MEDIA L. Rpm [BNA] 2454, 2455 (Ga.
1980) (supersedeas motion); Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Macomb, 405 Mich. 544,
547, 275 N.W.2d 482, 483 (1979) (superintending control); KFGO v. Rothe, 5 ME-
DIA L. Rpm. [BNA] 2642, 2642 (N.D. 1980) (permanent injunction).
The remaining traditionally recognized exceptions to the final judgment
rule share the essential characteristics of either the collateral order doctrine or
the extraordinary writs. Statutes or rules permitting certification of questions
for appeal allow trial judges to authorize appeals from interlocutory orders that
meet stated criteria for "significance," see 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976 & Supp. III
1979), or that are final with respect to only some parties in a multi-party action.
See FED. R. Crv. P. 54(b). The former are based on the same rationale that
often underlies mandamus--the need of the trial court for guidance in deciding
a difficult issue-and the latter have obvious similarities to collateral orders.
See text accompanying notes 71-74 infra, 14-15 supra. Useful only in civil ac-
tions, these statutes and rules have limited application to immediate review of
orders pertaining to closure motions, which usually arise in criminal contexts.
But see Cazarez v. Church of Scientology, 6 MEDIA L. RPm [BNA] 2109, 2109
(Fla. 1980); Sentinel Star v. Edwards, 6 MEDIA L. Rpm [BNA] 1603, 1603 (Fla.
1980); English v. McCrary, 328 So. 2d 257, 258 (Fla. 1976), affd, 348 So. 2d 293
(1977); cf. CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 236 (6th Cir. 1975) (gag order);
Cooper v. Rocklord Newspapers, Inc., 34 Ill. App. 3d 645, 646, 339 N.E.2d 477, 478
(1975) (same); ABC v. Smith Cabinet Mfg. Co., 160 Ind. App. 367, 369, 312 N.E.2d
85, 86 (1974) (same).
Other limited or abandoned exceptions only add to the confusion. The old-
est exception arises out of Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 204 (1848),
which held that decisions regarding the immediate delivery of property from
one party to another were immediately appealable. For an example of an aban-
doned exception, see Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967) (abandoned in Coopers & Lybrand v.
Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 474 (1978)); Cohen, "Not Dead But Only Sleeping" The
Rejection of the Death-Knell Doctrine and the Survival of Class Actions Denied
Certification, 59 B.U.. REv. 257, 267-73 (1979).
22. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 2, at 91-92.
23. 379 U.S. 148 (1964).
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trial court's dismissal of the claims of several members of a de-
cedent's family in a wrongful death action, despite the lack of
certification of that issue for appeal.2 4 The Supreme Court
stated:
[O]ur cases long have recognized that whether a ruling is 'final' within
the meaning of § 1291 is frequently so close a question that decision of
that issue either way can be supported with equally forceful argu-
ments, and that it is impossible to devise a formula to resolve all margi-
nal cases coming within what might be called the 'twilight zone' of
finalty 25
Because of the difficulty in determining whether an order is 'fi-
nal," the Court reiterated that the term should be given a
"practical rather than a technical construction,"2 6 and balanced
"the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review on the one
hand and the danger of denying justice by delay on the
other."27
The Gillespie balancing test is unique among the various
exceptions to the traditional final judgment rule in that it at-
tempts to encompass all questions of appealability. 28 The Gil-
lespie opinion has been severely criticized, however, for its
"clouded reasoning and enigmatic conclusions";2 9 in short, it
has failed to provide courts with the orderly retreat from the
final judgment rule that some commentators have advised.30
Courts attempting to use the Gillespie balancing approach
have not only had trouble with the test itself, but have had par-
ticular difficulty in reconciling its use with the other recognized
exceptions to the final judgment rule.3'
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976 & Supp. I 1979) allows a trial court judge in a
civil action to authorize an appeal when the order "involves a controlling ques-
tion of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion
and... an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ulti-
mate termination of the litigation." Id.
25. 379 U.S. at 152.
26. Id. (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546
(1949)).
27. Id. at 152-53 (quoting Dickenson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338
U.S. 507, 511 (1950)).
28. Although the Gillespie opinion could lead one to believe that the Court
had merely expanded the definition of 'final," one commentator has noted that
"[u]nder traditional standards, the order in Gillespie could in no sense be con-
sidered marginally final. There was no question that much remained to be
done at the trial leveL" See Redish, supra note 2, at 118. Nor were the issues
within the collateral exception of Cohen, since all of the dismissed claims could
have been "readily revived on a successful appeal after trial" Id. Therefore,
Gillespie must be considered another "exception" to the final judgment rule.
See note 2 supra.
29. See C. WluGfr, supra note 11, § 101, at 511; Redish, supra note 2, at 118.
30. See Note, supra note 9, at 609.
31. See generally United States v. Powers, 622 F.2d 317 (8th Cir.), cert de-
11171981]
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This difficulty is evident in the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peal's decision in United States v. Powers,3 2 the only instance
of judicial invocation of the Gillespie test in a case involving an
appeal from an order regarding a motion for closure. In Pow-
ers, the Eighth Circuit rejected the defendant's appeal on the
trial court's interlocutory order denying his request for a closed
trial insofar as the appeal was based on mandamus or the Co-
hen collateral order doctrine, 33 but ultimately permitted appel-
late review under the balancing test of Gillespie.34 A majority
of the circuit court panel interpreted Gillespie to permit courts
to grant immediate review of first impression issues, foreshad-
owing numerous subsequent cases in which early review might
clarify the court's position and give guidance to the trial
courts.35 The entire panel recognized that the closure issue in
Gillespie raised such an issue. The dissenting judge, however,
thought that immediate review could be granted only under
mandamus, not under the Gillespie balancing approach,3 6 be-
cause use of a court's "supervisory power" to discuss issues of
first impression normally justifies mandamus jurisdiction 37 and
because the trial court had abused its discretion, another man-
damus consideration.3 8 Thus, while immediate review was
available under either Gillespie or mandamus, the Eighth Cir-
cuit justices could not agree on the most appropriate approach,
despite the similarity of their rationales.
nied, 101 S. Ct. 112 (1980) (see notes 32-38 infra and accompanying text); Red-
ish, supra note 2, at 120-21. Redish notes that in many decisions of lower courts
that had applied Gillespie, "common sense applications of traditional rules of
finality" would have resulted in an immediate appeal anyway. Redish, supra
note 2, at 120. He also notes that in numerous cases when Gillespie would have
"been logically appropriate" no mention of Gillespie was made, while in other
cases courts recognized the existence of Gillespie but construed it so narrowly
that the fundamentals of the final judgment rule were preserved. Id. at 121.
Moreover, most courts that use the Gillespie balancing approach also rely on
one of the more established exceptions to the final judgment rule for support.
Id.
32. 622 F.2d 317 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 112 (1980).
33. Id. at 319-20 n.2.
34. Id.
35. Id.; see Gannett Pac. Corp. v. Richardson, 59 Hawaii 224, 227, 580 P.2d
49, 53 (1978) (court heard request for prohibition to prevent closure of a prelim-
inary hearing partially because "it appears... only too clear that the district
courts are in immediate need of direction from this court on a procedural and
substantive matter of public importance"); note 4 supra.
36. United States v. Powers, 622 F.2d at 327-28 (McMillan, J., dissenting).
37. See 622 F.2d at 327 (McMillan, J., dissenting). See generally note 17
supra and accompanying text.
38. See 622 F.2d at 327 (McMillan, J., dissenting). See generally note 17
supra and accompanying text.
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C. TAE NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH
The Supreme Court recognized long ago that the case law
on finality was "not altogether harmonious,"39 and more re-
cently noted that "[n]o verbal formula yet devised can explain
prior finality decisions with unerring accuracy or provide an ut-
terly reliable guide for the future."40 The Court's desire to fol-
low a pragmatic approach to finality questions, though
understandable, has nevertheless led to confusion and uncer-
tainty, striking at the heart of the rationale for the general final
judgment rule by encouraging numerous appeals, inconsistent
decisions, and waste of judicial resources.
If in Gillespie the Supreme Court was attempting to begin
an orderly retreat from the strictures of the traditional final
judgment rule and its exceptions, 41 its failure to reduce the
confusion does not mean that a balancing approach is an inap-
propriate method of dealing with the problem. Indeed, one
commentator has argued that a broad view of appellate juris-
diction, such as that suggested by Gillespie, is certainly prefer-
able to an expansion of existing exceptions to the final
judgment rule, which would only provide "make-shift substi-
tutes for the establishment of a rational, flexible and predict-
able balancing approach."42 Under this modification of the
Gillespie approach, courts would determine appealability after
consideration of four specific factors:
1) the delay which might result before the case would ultimately be
heard on appeal after a final judgment, 2) the harm such delay would
cause to the litigant's financial and personal situation, ... 3) the length
and expense of discovery and trial, in relation to the relative financial
capabilities of the parties seeking appeal, that may prove unnecessary
if the district court's order is ultimately reversed[, and]
... [4) ] the likelihood that the order from which appeal is sought
will be reversed.4 3
Though superior to the open-ended Gillespie test, this ap-
proach fails to offer a method of assigning relative weights to
the particular factors, or to suggest any other means by which a
39. McGourkey v. Toledo & 0. Cent. Ry. Co., 146 U.S. 536, 545 (1892); see
Dickenson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950).
40. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974).
41. Cf. Redish, supra note 2, at 98, 116 (expansion of appealability neces-
sary because "[i]n a significant number of cases not falling within any of the
established exceptions to the final judgment rule... the danger of prejudicing
the litigants as a result of delaying appeal will be so substantial as to outweigh
any countervailing interest in avoiding the harms of piecemeal appeal").
42. Id. at 127.
43. Id. at 100.
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court can compare these factors in a given case.44 The ap-
proach therefore does little to alleviate, and may exacerbate,
the confusion in the area of finality. A balancing approach
without clear guidelines leads to an increase in the number of
appeals filed and thus to an increase in delay and expense for
the parties and the courts. 45 Moreover, appellate courts likely
find it difficult to dismiss appeals summarily when they lack
guidance in deciding where the balance lies in a particular
case.4 6 Finally, an unclear balancing test results in uncon-
trolled discretion and inconsistency among the appellate
courts. 47 A principled approach that is based upon the policies
and purposes underlying the final judgment rule and its excep-
tions, but that avoids the arbitrary application of the traditional
approach and the problems of uncertainty and delay caused by
unclear balancing tests, is needed.
I. A TEST FOR APPEALABIIT=Y
A. BASIC FACTORS UNDERLYING THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH
TO FINALrrY
The purpose of the final judgment rule and its exceptions,
like that of many procedural rules, is to achieve an equitable
resolution of disputes at minimal cost to the parties and the ju-
dicial system.48 Courts that apply the traditional approach to
finality seek to accomplish that purpose by performing a
gatekeeping function: the final judgment rule and its excep-
tions are used to allow immediate appeals only when the
costs49 to the judicial system as a whole of allowing such ap-
peals are less than the costs of deferring resolution of the is-
44. Redish does indicate, however, that there must be some possibility that
the order will be reversed, otherwise there will be little point to hearing the ap-
peal. See id.
45. See C. WRiGuT, supra note 11, § 101, at 504 (delay caused by interlocu-
tory appeals "can be justified only if it is outweighed by the advantage of set-
tling prior to final decision an important issue in the case"). Recently, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals has had to limit the appealability of disqualifi-
cation of attorney orders, due in part to a large number of appeals from such
orders. See Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 437-38 (2d Cir.), cert pending,
No. 80-433 (1980 Term); accord, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 101 S.
Ct. 669 (1981).
46. See Redish, supra note 2, at 103. An increase in appeals also risks un-
dermining the authority of the trial courts. See Wright, The Doubtful Omnis-
cience of Appellate Courts, 41 MmN. L REV. 751, 787 (1957).
47. See Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 606 F.2d 420, 422 (4th Cir. 1979).
48. See generally, Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure in
Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973).
49. The term "cost" will be used in this Note in a broad sense to include
tangible monetary costs, less tangible time costs, and costs involved in errone-
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sues until trial's end.5 0 The basic final judgment rule thus
expresses the legislative and judicial judgment that, as a gen-
eral matter, the aggregate costs to the system are minimized
when an aggrieved party is denied immediate appeal of inter-
locutory issues and is forced to wait until the end of trial for ap-
pellate review.
Several factors weigh against piecemeal review. Each time
an appeal is filed and heard, monetary costs are incurred by
the parties and the judicial system. The parties must prepare
briefs and argue the appeal and the judicial system must dock-
et the appeal, hear the argument, and decide the issues. 51 The
system also must bear the costs of delay attendant upon mat-
ters that remain unresolved pending an appellate decision,5 2
costs that are magnified if review proceeds piecemeal.5 3 Fi-
nally, the quality of appellate decision making suffers because
the number of appeals increases and piecemeal review pre-
vents decisions from being made on a complete record.54
In contrast, two factors favor immediate appellate review.
The first is the resource cost of a new trial should the judgment
be reversed on review and a new trial be required. When is-
sues are appealed and decided as they arise, the probability of
ous decision making. For a discussion of how such costs are related to the effi-
ciency of judicial administration, see id. at 441-42.
50. See generally, C. WRIGHT, supra note 11, § 101, at 504.
51. See J. COUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL & A. MI=R, CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES
AND MATERIAls 972 (3d ed. 1980).
52. The costs of piecemeal review to the system can be characterized as
"resource" costs-time and money-and "decisional" costs-ineffective deci-
sion making resulting from resource pressures and incomplete records. These
costs are generally static, except for the cost of delay occasioned by immediate
appeal. Depending on the circumstances of the individual opposing immediate
appeal, the cost of delay can be minimal or severe. For example, avoiding delay
is of critical importance to a criminal defendant awaiting an appeal before the
continuation of his or her trial while in jail, because it can violate the defend-
ant's sixth amendment right to a speedy trial. Although there are no constitu-
tional implications, delay may also have serious consequences for a civil
litigant, for example, when an injunction continues or is lifted pending an ap-
peal. The problem of assessing the variable damage caused by delay to an indi-
vidual can be isolated from the proposed test of appealability, however, and can
be dealt with procedurally once the decision as to appealability is made. See
note 91 infra and accompanying text. Resource costs need not be incurred if
the issue is mooted by trial's end or if the party desiring interlocutory appeal
ultimately succeeds in the trial court. Moreover, a trial court may decide to
modify an order before the trial ends.
53. Piecemeal review also offers a greater opportunity for financial harass-
ment of litigants. See J. COUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL & A. M=R, supra note 51, at
972; Redish, supra note 2, at 104-05. For example, a party suing a large corpora-
tion without an expectation of a large damage award could be harassed by fre-
quent immediate appeals to the point of dropping the suit altogether.
54. See Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 606 F.2d 420, 422 (4th Cir. 1979).
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a reversal upon review at the end of a trial is relatively low, be-
cause most significant substantive and procedural issues are
resolved during trial; when error would have resulted in a new
trial, the immediate appeal has saved these costs. Reservation
of the issues until trial's end makes the costs of a new trial nec-
essary if a significant error is made.5 5 A second factor weighing
in favor of immediate appeal is the credibility cost associated
with the failure of trial-end review to protect significant collat-
eral rights or interests of parties or non-parties that will not be
merged in the final judgment;5 6 such interests can only be pro-
tected through immediate appeal.
In the aggregate, the considerations against piecemeal re-
view outweigh the considerations in favor of immediate review.
Although the costs of a new trial are substantial, the "harm-
less" nature of many orders57 and the tendency of appellate
courts to affirm trial court judgments5 8 suggest that the risk of
a new trial is not significant. Additionally, liberal rules for join-
der,59 class actions, 60 and intervention 6l suggest that most trial
court orders will not affect "collateral" rights for which an ade-
quate post-trial remedy for error is not available. The final
judgment requirement is, therefore, an appropriate general
rule. When the possibility of reversal and a new trial, or of the
inability of the court to remedy the effects of an erroneous rul-
ing upon later review, is particularly great, however, the gen-
eral rule represents an inefficient policy choice. Thus, trial
court orders adversely affecting significant rights or interests
under circumstances suggesting a relatively high probability of
error, or adversely affecting significant collateral rights or inter-
ests, have formed the basis for most instances in which an ex-
ception to the final judgment rule has been applied.
1. Significant Right or Interest
All of the traditional exceptions to the final judgment rule
55. For a definition of "significant error," see note 62 infra.
56. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
57. An error is regarded as harmless "if, upon an examination of the entire
record, substantial prejudice [to the defendant] does not appear." Berger v.
United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82 (1935); see United States v. Handly, 591 F.2d 1125,
1132 (5th Cir. 1979).
58. See, e.g., Note, The Minnesota Supreme Court 1970-1971, 56 MINN. I
RFV. 928, 934 (1972) (of a total of 282 cases appealed to the Minnesota Supreme
Court in the 1970-71 term, 215, or 76%, were affirmed).
59. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 20.
60. See, e.g., FED. . Cirv. P. 23.
61. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 24.
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have required that the appealed issue be in some sense signifi-
cant.62 For example, in deciding the extent to which appellate
courts can exercise supervisory power under mandamus, the
Supreme Court has stated that such power should be used only
to settle important questions of law.63 Similarly, in Cohen, the
Court noted that immediate appeal should be limited to "seri-
ous"64 questions "too important to be denied review."65 Al-
though in Gillespie66 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals did
not explicitly require that the appeal involve a significant issue,
such a requirement may be inferred from the balancing test it-
self. As at least one commentator has noted, if the danger of
postponing review is to outweigh the costs of piecemeal review,
such danger must be substantial, or else "the danger of preju-
dicing litigants as a result of delaying appeal will be so sub-
stantial as to outweigh any countervailing interest."67
This threshold requirement that the issue involve a signifi-
cant right or interest before it can receive immediate appellate
review is consistent with the interest in conserving the re-
sources and preserving the credibility of the judicial system. If
the possibility of a reversal and a new trial is the consideration
tipping the balance in favor of immediate appeal, the right or
interest affected by the order must be significant, since harm-
less error is insufficient to warrant reversal and a new trial.
Similarly, if the inability of the court to remedy the effects of
an erroneous order upon later review--collaterality-is the fac-
tor justifying immediate appeal, the issue must be significant,
since the protection of insignificant collateral rights would not
outweigh the disadvantages of piecemeal review. 68
62. A significant right or interest is a right or interest that is protected by
the United States Constitution or one that if erroneously affected by an order
of the trial court would warrant reversal and the grant of a new trial. For the
purposes of this Note, it is assumed that an error of constitutional magnitude
should at least warrant proceeding with the balance of the proposed test for ap-
pealability. Cf. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22-24 (1967) (doctrine of
"harmless constitutional error" articulated); Goldberg, Harmless Error: Consti-
tutional Sneak Thief, J. Cinm. L & CRIINOLOGY 421, 421 n.3, 441-42 (1980) (con-
stitutional errors should receive automatic reversals; ten percent of all criminal
appeals since Chapman have been decided on basis of "harmless constitutional
error" doctrine).
63. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 111-12 (1964).
64. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547 (1949).
65. Id. at 546.
66. Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964).
67. Redish, supra note 2, at 98.
68. The level of significance required for an appeal involving collateral
rights or interests arguably should be less than that required for an appeal on a
matter important enough to require reversal if an error were made, since collat-
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A determination that the interest affected by the interlocu-
tory order is significant, however, does not itself justify an im-
mediate appeal. Appeals of important issues such as the
admissibility of evidence are postponed until the end of trial as
a matter of course in our judicial system.69 Immediate appeal
of orders affecting even significant rights or interests is justified
only in those instances in which significant costs to the judicial
system as a whole can be saved by immediate appellate review.
2. Probability of Error
The final judgment rule implicitly recognizes that the
probability of error at the trial court level is sufficiently low to
assume that the costs of new trials ordered or collateral rights
lost, in the few cases in which significant errors are made, are
outweighed by the judicial costs saved by avoiding immediate
appeal of all trial court orders. Some classes of orders are sub-
ject to a higher probability of trial court error than others;
when significant rights or interests are involved, immediate ap-
peal is justified for these orders because the relatively high
probability of error increases the likelihood that the costs of a
new trial or of loss of collateral rights will accrue. 70
Traditional exceptions to the final judgment rule suggest
the kinds of orders that have been associated with a high
probability of trial court error. Under the original interpreta-
tion of the use of extraordinary writs, for example, courts
stated that the costs of immediate appeal were justified only
when a lower court had abused its discretion, or, in other
words, when the costs of a new trial or failure to protect collat-
eral rights were virtually certain to accrue.7 1 Under current
practice, however, the required risk of error seems to have less-
ened. Courts now invoke the supervisory power of mandamus
to hear appeals of "issues of first impression"7 2-- issues that,
while not necessarily wrongly decided, are susceptible of erro-
neous resolution by lower courts because of the lack of appel-
late guidance. Thus, in cases presenting an obvious error by
eral interests can rarely be protected once a trial has ended. See note 13 supra
and accompanying text.
69. See McComnci's HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 181, at 426 (2d
ed. E. Cleary 1972).
70. See Redish, supra note 2, at 106 n.94. The assumption that the appel-
late court will render a better decision on the matter than the trial court may
not hold true for immediate appeals because of the problem of piecemeal re-
view. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.




the lower court, made on a matter of significance,73 or regarding
a significant issue that the court has not confronted previously
or upon which other courts have developed new case law,74 the
appellate court need not wait until final judgment to make its
decision.
3. Collaterality
Given the threshold requirement of a significant right or in-
terest, the third factor that justifies immediate review is the re-
lation of the collateral rights or interests affected by the order
to the merits of the case. The Cohen exception reflects the ju-
dicial recognition that when final judgment comes "it will be
too late effectively to review [a collateral] order, and the rights
... will have been lost, probably irreparably."75 Two kinds of
trial court orders may affect these collateral interests. First, a
trial judge may issue an order that affects the rights of a party
but that will not be merged in the final judgment and therefore
cannot be considered on review. 76 Second, a trial judge may is-
sue an order that is unobjectionable to the parties, but that
nevertheless affects important rights of a non-party.7 7 In either
context, the order, if erroneous, will not be corrected on review,
resulting in resource and credibility costs if immediate appeal
is not available.78
73. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that:
A rule of thumb as to the meaning of the abuse of discretion standard
provides that the trial court's exercise of discretion should not be dis-
turbed unless there is a "definite and firm conviction that the court be-
low committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached
upon a weighing of the relevant factors."
Anderson v. Air West, Inc., 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976) (quoting In re Jo-
sephson, 218 F.2d 174 (lst Cir. 1974)). See also Rosenberg, Appellate Review of
Trial Court Discretion, 79 F.RD. 173, 180 (1978).
74. See, e.g., Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 109 (1964) (constitutional
validity of FED. R. Civ. P. 35(a) question of first impression since not previously
challenged); United States v. Powers, 622 F.2d 317, 327 (8th Cir.) (McMillan, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 112 (1980).
75. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). Irrepara-
ble injury should be distinguished from mere inconvenience, as it '!results from
a ruling which operates to deny a substantive right and which cannot be cor-
rected on appeal from final judgment." Redish, supra note 2, at 113 n.126.
76. In Cohen, for example, the plaintiff appealed the requirement of post-
ing a substantial bond to cover the costs of the trial in the event he lost the
action. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. at 545.
77. For example, the defendant and the prosecutor in a criminal case may
agree to close the entire trial and thereby infringe on the public's right to an
open trial. See note 4 supra.
78. For example, if a member of the public is forbidden to immediately ap-
peal an order to close a proceeding, the public will suffer the costs of such a
refusal because no appeal may be taken after the trial. Although the public
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B. A PROPOSED TEST
A test based upon these three criteria-a significant right
or interest, probability of error, and collaterality-has two dis-
tinct advantages: elimination of confusion and relative ease of
administration. Under the proposed test, the court would first
determine whether the rights or interests adversely affected by
the order are significant. If they are not, no appeal should be
allowed. If they are significant, the court need only ask
whether the probability of error is high-such as with an obvi-
ous abuse of discretion or an issue of first impression-or
whether the issue is collateral to the merits of the case. Be-
cause all of the exceptions to the final judgment rule involve
one of these alternative factors, it is only necessary that either
probability of error or collaterality, along with a significant
right or interest, be present to justify an immediate appeal.
The test is also preferable to a discretionary balancing test
because it offers greater guidance to attorneys and the courts
than the Gillespie court's balancing of the "inconvenience and
costs of piecemeal review on the one hand and the danger of
denying justice on the other."79 Moreover, because this test
adopts and weighs the relevant factors and eliminates from
consideration those factors that are insignificant,8 0 attorneys
can easily determine whether an appeal will be granted in a
may be able to receive a transcript of the trial after the trial has ended, see, e.g.,
Oneonta Star v. Moore, 6 MED. L Rpm [BNA] 2043, 2047 (N.Y. 1980); Merola v.
Warner, 74 A.D.2d 287, 288, 427 N.Y.S.2d 808, 809 (1981), this may be inadequate
relief. Cf. Merola v. Bell, 47 N.Y.2d 985, 987, 419 N.Y.S.2d 965, 966 (1979), cert
denied, 100 S. Ct. 3055 (1980) (access to redacted transcripts after trial was suf-
ficient to protect media's rights).
Although only the exceptions to the final judgment rule as applied to or-
ders respecting closure motions have been examined here, the remaining tradi-
tional exceptions to the final judgment rule, see note 21 supra and
accompanying text, are also based on factors noted in this section. In the case
of a § 1292(b) certification, see note 21 supra, the trial judge is explicitly seek-
ing appellate court guidance on a significant issue. An appeal certified under
FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) is based upon a determination that the parties appellant
are now collateral to the underlying merits of the case. The Forgay exception,
see note 21 supra, addresses the possibility of a party suffering "irreparable
harm."
79. Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964) (quoting
Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1949)).
80. For example, delay that could result before a case is ultimately heard
on appeal after a final judgment is arguably already weighed in the original
final judgment rule balance. See Redish, supra note 2, at 100. If this delay was
so extreme as to cause irreparable harm, however, the matter would be appeal-
able as a significant collateral interest.
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given case and the appropriate procedures to follow.81 Further,
appellate courts will be able to determine whether to consider
an appealability issue and how to decide it. The proposed test
should ultimately result in a reduced consumption of judicial
resources and an improvement in judicial decision making.82
This test can be used to determine the immediate appeala-
bility of orders affecting plaintiffs, defendants, and non-parties
in both civil and criminal cases. It must be recognized, how-
ever, that in at least criminal cases, the costs of delay incurred
as a result of immediate appeal from an interlocutory order are
to be given more weight than in the normal case, because of the
criminal defendant's right to speedy trial and the double jeop-
ardy prohibition.83 One solution to this problem is to grant an
immediate appeal when it is warranted, without granting a stay
of the underlying proceeding.84 In situations in which the issue
81. A choice between attempting an appeal under one of the exceptions to
the final judgment rule or seeking an extraordinary writ need not be made.
82. The test presented here is not the only possible ordering of the factors.
Other commentators and courts have also attempted to provide a conceptual
framework addressing salient factors. For example, three policy considerations
have been suggested as rationales underlying all of the exceptions:
(1) alleviation of hardship by providing an opportunity to review or-
ders of the trial court before they irreparably modify the rights of the
litigants; (2) supervisions of the development of the law by providing a
mechanism for resolving conflicts among trial courts on issues not nor-
mally open on final appeal; and (3) avoidance of a waste of trial court
time by providing an opportunity to review orders before they result in
fruitless litigation and wasted expense.
Note, supra note 9, at 609 (footnotes omitted). The Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals has listed five factors to be considered when granting mandamus; these
factors, however, fall neatly into the three categories considered under the test
proposed herein. See Bauman v. United States District Court, 557 F.2d 650, 654-
55 (9th Cir. 1977). Professor Redish has also suggested four factors to be taken
into account to determine appealability. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
The conceptual ordering in this Note provides a more workable test in that
it takes into account all important policy concerns, without any extraneous or
repetitive concerns, and attempts to provide a means to weigh these concerns
so that courts can objectively apply the resulting test.
83. The defendant is protected from double jeopardy by the fifth amend-
ment, while the sixth amendment protects his or her right to a speedy trial. A
speedy trial right is applicable to appeals from pretrial orders because a de-
fendant's right to a speedy trial is of little concern once the trial has begun.
See Merola v. Bell, 47 N.Y.2d 985, 987, 419 N.Y.S.2d 965, 966 (1979), cert. denied,
100 S. Ct. 3055 (1980). Once the trial has begun, however, double jeopardy lim-
its the appealability of some interlocutory orders.
Delay may also work hardship on parties to civil litigation, but the delay is
presumably not as serious as in criminal cases when the defendant may be ei-
ther in jail or threatened by criminal prosecution. Cf. Redish, supra note 2, at
98-99 (examples of harm that delay can cause in a civil context).
84. Actually, there are three possible procedural routes: 1) the grant of an
immediate appeal with a stay of the lower court proceedings; 2) the grant of an
immediate appeal without a stay; and 3) review at trial's end. Most courts have
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involved is irrelevant to the actual proceedings, this solution is
adequate. 85 In cases in which the issue involved directly affects
the proceedings in the courtroom, such as those involving clo-
sure, an appeal without a stay inadequately protects the rights
underlying the appeal; by the time an immediate appeal will
have worked its way through the system, the trial below will
normally have long since ended.86 It is necessary, therefore, to
provide for an expedited appeal when the proposed test indi-
cates that the order affects rights or interests connected with
the trial itself. This will reduce the costs of delay to the de-
fendant. An expedited appeal is not a novel suggestion.8 7 In
the federal courts, extraordinary writ petitions are given prior-
ity over other appellate court matters,8 8 and the courts require
the petitioner to set forth reasons why immediate review is
warranted so that such petitions can be summarily reviewed.8 9
Most importantly, however, the grant of an extraordinary writ
"is always discretionary, [and] may be denied out of hand,
without a hearing and with a minimum of procedural maneu-
vering."90 Any delay is therefore minimal.91 When combined
been willing to hear an appeal from a closure decision that was filed before the
trial ended but was not actually argued or decided until after the trial ended,
on the ground that although the issue is moot, it is capable of repetition and
should be reviewed. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814,
2820 (1980); United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 846 (3d Cir. 1978); Commer-
cial Printing Co. v. Lee, 262 Ark. 87, 91, 553 S.W.2d 270, 272 (1977); cf. United
Press Ass'n v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 76, 123 N.E.2d 777, 778 (1954); E.W. Scripps
Co. v. Fulton, 100 Ohio App. 157, 160, 125 N.E.2d 896, 899 (1955).
85. See, e.g., Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) (order denying motion to re-
duce bail). In Stack, the Court held that the order was appealable as a collat-
eral issue because "an order fixing bail can be reviewed without halting the
main trial-its issues are entirely independent of the issues to be tried." Id. at
12.
86. In the case of a government appeal, no new trial could be ordered be-
cause of the double jeopardy clause. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
87. In Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), Justice Brennan
in his concurring opinion stated: "In this case, prior restraints were in effect for
over 11 weeks, and yet by the time those restraints expired, appellate review
had not yet been exhausted. Moreover, appellate courts might not accord these
cases the expedited hearings they so clearly would merit." Id. at 609 n.38
(Brennan, J., concurring).
88. FED. R. APP. P. 23(b). FED. R. APP. P. 3(a) also provides for a form of
expedited appeal for orders certified under § 1292(b).
89. FED. R. APP. P. 21(a). This requirement may also have the effect of dis-
couraging groundless petitions. See Note, supra note 13, at 473 n.116.
90. 9 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 1, § 110.10, at 136.
91. Commentators on "gag" orders have suggested other methods for expe-
diting appeals. See, e.g., Landau, The Challenge of the Communications Media,
62 A.B..J. 55, 59 (1976); Rendleman, Free Press-Fair Trial: Review of Silence
Orders, 52 N.CJ. REv. 127, 164 (1973); Roney, The Bar Answers the Challenge,
62 A.B-.AJ. 60, 60 (1976) (ABA committee recommends appeal before issue is
moot). One such proposal suggests that the next highest appellate court in the
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with this system of expediting appeals in criminal cases, the
test proposed above adequately balances the salient factors un-
derlying the final judgment rule and its exceptions.
IV. APPLICATION TO APPEALS FROM
CLOSURE ORDERS
Recent decisions in which the Supreme Court has ex-
pressed a willingness to accept limitations upon public access
to various stages of criminal proceedings have led to numerous
requests for closed proceedings. Courts continue to debate the
merits of the conflict between the interests of the public and
the parties in open proceedings and the interests that may be
furthered by the protection offered by closure. Meanwhile, in-
terested parties have continued to press for recognition of their
rights with respect to motions for closure, and the courts have
failed to develop a consistent approach for handling the parties'
concerns once an order granting or denying the motion has
been issued.
The proposed test for the appealability of interlocutory or-
ders can be applied by courts to the common situations involv-
ing closure motions to provide greater uniformity and certainty
than can be achieved under the traditional approach. Such is
the case when the defendant appeals from orders granting or
denying closure, the prosecutor appeals from orders granting or
jurisdiction be allowed five days to review the gag order. See Note, Ungagging
the Press: Expedited Relief From Prior Restraints on News Coverage of Crimi-
nal Proceedings, 65 GEo. IJ. 81, 117 (1976). During that time the underlying
criminal proceeding would continue and the "gag" would remain in force. Id. at
118. After the five days had elapsed, however, the order would automatically
expire. Id. at 117.
It is hoped that, under the five-day approach, appellate courts would be
prompt in their review of such orders, at least when the order appeared to be
constitutional, to ensure that defendants' rights to a fair trial would be
respected. See, e.g., United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 843 (3d Cir. 1978).
Under this proposal, the defendants' rights to a speedy trial would be com-
pletely guarded, but the public's right to be present at the proceeding would be
somewhat infringed. In order to preserve both the rights of the defendant and
of the public, therefore, the above proposal should be modified so that the en-
tire proceeding is stayed during the five-day waiting period. Furthermore, the
stay would only commence if a person other than the defendant submitted a
petition for appeal, as in current extraordinary writ practice. See generally text
accompanying notes 88-90 supra. For a closure case in which an expedited writ
with a stay was granted, see Gannett Pac. Corp. v. Richardson, 59 Hawaii 224,
226-27, 580 P.2d 49, 52-53 (1978). Although this method might infringe on defend-
ants' right to a speedy trial, it probably would be a slight infringement that
would not give rise to a constitutional violation. Moreover, unlike the above




denying closure, or the media or the public appeals from orders
granting closure.
A. APPEALS BY DEFENDANTS
1. Appealing an Order Denying Closure
Defendants may attempt to have various stages of their
proceedings closed for a number of reasons: they may desire to
have a pretrial hearing closed to protect against jury contami-
nation9 2 or they may wish to have entire trials closed to avoid
scandal or embarrassment to themselves or a witness,9 3 to pro-
tect against prejudice of pending litigation in the same or a
neighboring jurisdiction,94 or even out of fear for their lives or
those of family members.9 5 All of these interests involve the
defendant's fundamental right to a fair trial,9 6 the violation of
which will result in a reversal of the conviction and a new
trial.97 A significant right of the defendant is therefore in-
volved, and the threshold test for the appealability of an order
denying closure is met.
The determination of whether the probability of error in
the lower court's denial of closure is sufficiently large to justify
an immediate appeal-whether there is an abuse of discretion
or an issue of first impression--depends on the facts of each in-
dividual case. United States v. Powers9 a was the first case in
which the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals had confronted a
closure order since the Supreme Court's important Gannett de-
92. See, e.g., Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 378 (1979).
93. See, e.g., State v. Poindexter, 231 La. 630, 92 So. 2d 390 (1956) (denial of
closure so that defendant's witness would testify deprived defendant of fair
trial).
94. See, e.g., United States v. Fiurmara, 605 F.2d 116 (3d Cir. 1979).
95. See, e.g., United States v. Powers, 622 F.2d 317, 320-21 (8th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 101 S. Ct. 112 (1980).
96. See cases cited in notes 92-95 supra; cf. United States v. Duncan, 598
F.2d 839, 865-66 (4th Cir.) (pretrial publicity did not destroy defendant's right to
a fair trial), cert denied, 444 U.S. 871 (1979). Debate on the "free press-fair trial"
issue intensified in the last fifteen years because the Supreme Court had re-
versed a number of criminal convictions on the ground that pretrial publicity
denied the defendants their right to a fair trial. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell,
384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 550-52 (1965); Rideau v. Lou-
isiana, 373 U.S. 723, 727 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 725-29 (1961). For dis-
cussion of the issue, see Fenner & Koley, The Rights of the Press and the Closed
Court Criminal Proceeding, 57 NEB. L. REV. 442 (1978); Portman, The Defense of
Fair Trialfrom Sheppard to Nebraska Press Association: Benign Neglect to Af-
firnative Action and Beyond, 29 STAN. L. REv. 393 (1977); Note, supra note 91,
at 81 n.1.
97. See, e.g., People v. Jones, 418 N.Y.2d 409, 416, 391 N.E.2d 1335, 1340, 418
N.Y.S.2d 359, 364, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 946 (1979).98. 622 F.2d 317 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 212 (1980).
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cision.99 The fact situations in Gannett and Powers differed, 0 0
and there was also a question as to whether the majority's test
in Gannett, or the test found in Justice Blackmun's dissent,
was the appropriate test for closure.' 0 ' All of these considera-
tions produced a relatively high probability of error by the
lower court, justifying immediate appeal under the test pro-
posed by this Note. The court in Powers indicated, moreover,
that future interlocutory closure appeals on this issue would
not be heard, 0 2 a decision consistent with the proposed test,
because the probability of error in subsequent cases would be
very low.
Absent a high probability of error, collaterality will rarely
justify a defendant's immediate appeal from an order denying
closure. If the defendant is not acquitted in the original trial,
the defendant's rights to a fair trial are generally protected by
the possibility of appeal and a new, closed trial. 0 3 The delay,
expense, and hardship suffered by the defendant, as well as the
potential unavailability of important witnesses for the new
trial, are taken into consideration in the basic final judgment
rule. 0 4 These concerns are not unique to closure orders and do
not justify an immediate appeal under ordinary circum-
stances. 05
Given the many alternatives available to judges to guaran-
tee a fair trial, while keeping the trial open over defendants' ob-
jections, 0 6 closure will rarely be necessary to protect
significant rights of defendants. Thus, the general rule should
99. See 622 F.2d at 320 n.2.
100. Gannett involved a closed pretrial hearing, while Powers involved a
closed trial
101. Id. at 322-23. The court ultimately adopted Justice Blackmun's test. Ac-
cord, United States v. Civella, 493 F. Supp. 786, 789 (W.D. Mo. 1980).
102. See 622 F.2d at 320 n.2; accord, State ex rel. Feeney v. District Court,
607 P.2d 1259, 1267 (Wyo. 1980) (lack of exceptional circumstances barred use of
mandamus).
103. See generally State v. Velasquez, 76 N.M. 49, 412 P.2d 4, cert. denied, 385
U.S. 867 (1966).
104. See text accompanying notes 48-56 supra.
105. Ordinarily, these concerns are simply not significant enough to meet
the threshold test. In some cases, however, they may rise to a significant level.
For example, a situation could occur in which delay would lead to the death of
a party.
106. Courts have suggested such alternatives as admonitions to the jury
and, if necessary, sequestration, Oliver v. Postel, 30 N.Y.2d 171, 182-83, 282
N.E.2d 306, 311, 331 N.Y.S.2d 407, 415 (1972), voir dire, continuance, change of
venue, or jury instructions, State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v.
Kainrad, 46 Ohio St. 2d 349, 352, 348 N.E.2d 695, 697 (1976). Other alternatives
include: change of venire, enforcement of courtroom decorum, control over
courtroom personnel and officers of the court, mistrials, new trials, and rever-
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be that appeals of orders denying a defendant's request for a
closed proceeding should not be heard until after trial, unless
the case presents an issue of first impression or there has been
an abuse of discretion by the lower court. 0 7 This position is
supported by a majority of the courts that have addressed the
issue.10 8
2. Appealing an Order Granting Closure
Defendants may appeal orders that close the proceeding
sua sponte' 09 or at the request of the prosecution"lO--orders
usually made to protect a prosecution witness.", Because a
criminal defendant has a sixth amendment right to an open
trial,112 an incorrect decision to close a trial in its entirety will
generally constitute reversible error,"13 and will meet the
sals. Fenner & Koley, supra note 96, at 495-509; see Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563-64 (1976).
107. It can be argued that by requesting an immediate appeal in those cases
in which an immediate appeal is warranted, the defendant has waived the
prohibitions against delay in criminal trials. During the pendency of the ap-
peal, the defendant could be released under 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1976) and thus not
suffer great harm from delay. This argument seems rather harsh, however, and
it might be sound public policy to grant a stay of the underlying proceedings
and an expedited appeal for defendants as well as non-defendants.
108. Cf. Cromer v. Alameda County Sup. Court, 6 MEDIA L. Rm [BNA]
1821 (Cal. App. 1980) (court grants writ of mandamus to seal transcript of pur-
ported confession disclosed in closed pretrial hearing). See generally United
States v. Powers, 622 F.2d 317 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 112 (1980);
United States v. Fiumara, 605 F.2d 116 (3rd Cir. 1979); Mallott v. State, 608 P.2d
737 (Ala.. 1980). Although the Cromer court did not clearly indicate the reason
for its decision, Cromer can be considered an instance of abuse of discretion in
the lower court, as the appellate court found that in this extraordinary situa-
tion-the trial of a woman who allegedly kidnapped and murdered a five year
old boy-there was no other alternative that could protect the defendant's right
to a fair trial.
109. For cases involving sua sponte orders, see generally, Pechter v. Lyons,
441 F. Supp. 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Gannett, Inc. v. Mark, 54 A.D.2d 818, 387
N.Y.S.2d 336 (1976).
110. See, e.g., People v. Jones, 47 N.Y.2d 409, 412, 391 N.E.2d 1335, 1338, 418
N.Y.S.2d 359, 362, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 946 (1979). The state has initiated or
joined a motion to close a criminal proceeding in 46 out of 300 cases since the
Supreme Court's decision in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
See Court Watch Summary, supra note 4, at 34.
111. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lloyd v. Vincent, 520 F.2d 1272, 1274 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975); People v. Hinton, 31 N.Y.2d 71, 73, 286
N.E.2d 265, 266, 334 N.Y.S.2d 885, 887 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 911 (1973);
New York v. Cuevas, 69 A.D.2d 908, 909, 415 N.Y.S.2d 908, 909 (1979), rev'd on
other grounds, 50 N.Y.2d 1022, 409 N.E.2d 1360, 431 N.Y.S.2d 686. "State secrets"
have also been used to justify closure in at least one case. See United States v.
Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 669-70, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972) (exclusion of public
during discussion of anti-hijacking procedures).
112. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
113. See, e.g., People v. Jones, 47 N.Y.2d 409, 413, 391 N.E.2d 1335, 1338, 418
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threshold requirement of significance. If only a pretrial hearing
or a segment of the trial is closed to protect a state witness,
however, the error will not likely be serious enough to warrant
reversal.114 Thus, it appears that only some defendants' ap-
peals of orders granting closure will qualify for immediate ap-
peal under the threshold portion of the test.
The effect of the second factor, probability of error, will
again depend upon the specific facts of each case. For example,
if the trial court totally disregards the defendant's right to an
open trial and abuses its discretion by permitting a closed trial
merely because it is more convenient,115 an immediate remedy
is necessary to protect the defendant's constitutional rights.
Similarly, if the state requests closure to protect a witness in a
situation that has never occurred before, the request will pre-
sent an issue of first impression for the court and an immediate
appeal will probably be justified. On the other hand, if the trial
judge closes the trial on grounds very similar to those that ap-
pellate courts have repeatedly upheld, an immediate appeal
should not be granted, based upon the probability of error fac-
tor. Because a new, open trial should almost always be suffi-
cient to correct any harm to the defendant caused by a closed
trial,116 collaterality will rarely require the granting of an imme-
diate appeal from an order granting closure.
B. APPEALS BY THE PROSECUTMN
1. Appealing an Order Denying Closure
Occasionally, the prosecution will make a motion to close a
criminal proceeding to the public."17 Although the prosecu-
tion's burden of proof to justify closing a proceeding over a de-
fendant's objections is great, the right to public trials is not
N.Y.S.2d 359, 362 (closure of trial during testimony of state witness, without
showing need, not harmless error and new trial granted), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
946 (1979); New York v. Ludolph, 63 A.D.2d 77, 83, 407 N.Y.S.2d 85, 89 (1979) (de-
nial of open trial is reversible error).
114. But see People v. Jones, 47 N.Y.2d 409, 413, 391 N.E.2d 1335, 1338, 418
N.Y.S.2d 359, 362 (1979) (closure of trial during testimony of state witness, with-
out showing need, not harmless error and new trial granted).
115. Id.
116. See Beckman v. Commonwealth, 388 N.E.2d 678, 679 (Mass. 1979) ("the
error complained of must be irremediable so that an order for a new trial in the
normal process of appeal will not put the defendant in the status quo"). But
see Cromer v. Alameda County Superior Court, 6 MED. L. Rprr [BNA] 1821,
1823 (Cal. App. 1980) (appropriate standard is whether there is a 'reasonable
likelihood of substantial prejudice").
117. See generally note 110 supra.
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absolute,"18 and there may be instances in which an appellate
court would find the prosecution's interest in a closed proceed-
ing paramount. As in the preceding contexts, the court will
have to make the threshold determination of the significance of
the prosecution's right or interest in a closed proceeding. These
interests might, for example, involve such concerns as the abil-
ity of the state to present evidence," 9 or the protection of a
third party informant.120 These interests arguably are signifi-
cant, in that the effective functioning of the judicial system ulti-
mately depends upon the willingness of witnesses to come
forward at trial to present evidence.121 A closed proceeding
may be the only means available to secure witness cooperation.
Again, the impact of the probability of error factor will de-
pend upon whether the order resulted from either an abuse of
discretion or an attempted resolution of an issue of first im-
pression. Once the threshold test has been met, however, per-
haps the most important factor in determining the
appealability of an order of this type is the collaterality fac-
tor. 22 Because of double jeopardy considerations, 2 3 the prose-
118. The authorization for appeals by the government in criminal caes is
found in the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976). In
United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975), the Supreme Court noted that Con-
gress' intent in enacting this statute was to allow the courts to define the con-
stitutional boundaries of the government's right to appeal. Id. at 337. For a
detailed discussion of the issues raised by the double jeopardy clause, see
Comment, A Procedural Question to Appeal in Criminal Cases-The Govern-
ment's Right, 7 PEPPERDnE L. REv. 387 (1980).
119. See United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 670 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 991 (1972). In 1968, the statute that preceded the Omnibus Crime Control
Act of 1970, the Criminal Appeals Act, Pub. L. No. 223, 24 Stat. 1246 (1907), was
amended to allow government appeals from adverse pretrial suppression of evi-
dence rulings and from others forcing return of seized property. Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. I- No. 90-351, § 1301, 82 Stat.
197. This right to appeal has been retained under the new act. 18 U.S.C. § 3731
(1976).
120. See cases cited in note 111 supra.
121. See Nemerson, Coercive Sentencing, 64 MmN. L. REv. 669, 679 (1980).
122. As with defendants' appeals, whether the order possesses a high
probability of error as an abuse of discretion or as an issue of first impression
depends upon the individual case. See text accompanying notes 97-98 supra.
The probability of error factor, however, may never be considered if a closure
order, when issued over the state's objections, is sufficiently collateral to the
merits to justify immediate appeal under the collaterality factor. Although de-
fendants may argue at the close of trial that they were denied a fair trial or an
open trial and may convince the court that they should be granted a new trial,
the state, given double jeopardy considerations, has a much more limited right
to appeal from a final judgment. See text accompanying note 118 supra. Thus,
the state should generally be granted an immediate appeal from decisions re-
fusing closure of criminal proceedings, provided the issue first meets the
threshold level of significance.
123. See Comment, supra note 118.
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cution may not withhold evidence and appeal the decision at
the end of trial if a closed proceeding is not initially granted.
The state's interests are therefore collateral, and the state
should be granted an immediate appeal when the denial of a
closed proceeding significantly affects the ability of the prose-
cution to present its case.124
2. Appealing an Order Granting Closure
The prosecution may wish to appeal a closure order be-
cause of its interest in protecting the public's interest in open
trials,125 or for more self-serving reasons.1 2 6 Whether these in-
terests meet the threshold level of significance is a difficult
question. The interest of the prosecution in an open proceed-
ing is arguably less significant than its interest in a closed pro-
ceeding, for its interest in the latter is in protecting its ability to
present effectively its case against the defendantl 27-a public
interest that only the prosecution can protect. Furthermore, in
cases in which the media, as representatives of the public, have
not expressed an interest in closure, it is unlikely that signifi-
cant interests would be affected by a closed trial. If no member
of the public cares to appeal the order, any infringement of the
defendant's right against undue delay is unjustified. Accord-
ingly, the general rule should be that the prosecution is not en-
titled to immediate appellate review of an order granting
closure when the interest involved fails the threshold test of
significance. Only when the state can show an exceptional con-
124. This is an instance in which an expedited appeal is warranted. See
note 91 supra.
125. The Supreme Court in Gannett assumed that the prosecution would
dilgently protect the public's interest in open trials. See Gannett Co. v. DePas-
quale, 443 U.S. at 383-84. Since that decision, however, the prosecution has op-
posed closure motions in only 122 of 300 cases. See Court Watch Summary,
supra note 4, at 34.
126. It is always possible that the prosecuting attorney wishes to further his
or her own career through the publicity from the trial. It is more likely, how-
ever, that prosecutors will agree to closure. Prosecutors are more "interested
in a conviction which will stand on appeal; currently reversal of a conviction be-
cause of prejudicial publicity, through extremely rare, constitutes a real pos-
sibility while reversal of a conviction for infringement of the media's rights, of
course remains unheard of." Fenner & Koley, supra note 96, at 456 (emphasis
in original); cf. Merola v. Bell, 47 N.Y.2d 985, 393 N.E.2d 1038, 419 N.Y.S.2d 965
(1979) (prosecution appealed order granting closure), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct.
3055 (1980).
127. It is unlikely that the probability of error factor is relevant, as reversal
upon review from lower court error is rare, given double jeopardy concerns.
The prosecution could be successful, however, under the collaterality factor by
arguing that the public's interest in open trial would be irreparably harmed
without an immediate appeal. If immediate review is found to be warranted,
the appeal should be expedited. See note 91 supra.
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cern that rises to a significant interest should an appellate
court continue with the balance of the test.2 8
C. APPEALS BY THE PUBLIC OR THE MEDIA
The public, or the media as representatives of the public,129
may wish to appeal an order closing a proceeding when the
state, the defendant, or the trial judge desire it closed.130 Such
an appeal is predicated upon the public's interest in open tri-
als.131 Under current Supreme Court interpretation, the signifi-
cance of the rights or interests adversely affected by such an
order for purposes of determining whether immediate appeal is
appropriate depends upon whether the closed proceeding is a
pretrial hearing or a trial. In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,132 the
Supreme Court held that the public does not have a constitu-
tional right to attend a pretrial suppression hearing.133 One
year later, in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,3 4 the
Court held that public access to criminal trials is a fundamental
right that is constitutionally protected. 35 It might therefore be
argued that, while the right to attend a trial is significant and
meets the threshold test for appealability, the interest in at-
tending pretrial hearings does not meet this threshold, and im-
mediate appeals from decisions closing pretrial hearings should
never be allowed. 36
128. See text accompanying notes 83-91 supra.
129. Most commonly, the media are the appellants from orders closing the
trial. In at least one case, however, members of the general public appealed.
See Pechter v. Lyons, 441 F. Supp. 115, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (immigration hear-
ing on alleged Nazi war criminal closed).
130. Generally, the media or the public are allowed to intervene in the trial
for the purpose of arguing against closure when closure is ordered. See, e.g.,
United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 843 (3d Cir. 1978); Oklahoma Publishing
Co. v. Martin, 611 P.2d 253, 253 (Okla. 1980); State ex rel. Fenney v. District
Court, 607 P.2d 1259, 1268 (Wyo. 1980).
131. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814, 2829 (1980).
132. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
133. Id.
134. 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980).
135. The Court distinguished Gannett on the ground that it involved a pre-
trial suppression hearing, and held that the public does have a constitutionally
protected right to attend criminal trials. Id. at 2821. The public's right, how-
ever, is not absolute and can be outweighed by the "superior" interests of a fair
trial. Id. at 2830 n.18, 2821. By its nature, the pretrial suppression hearing is the
most attractive situation for limiting access of the public to the courtroom. See
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, 478 Pa. 484, 505-06, 387 A.2d 425, 436
(1978) ("The most damaging of all information from outside the courtroom
comes from the pre-trial suppression hearing."), dismissed, 443 U.S. 913 (1979).
136. Several arguments support the assertion that interests in open pretrial
hearings meet the significance threshold, however. First, merely because a
right is not constitutionally protected does not necessarily preclude it from be-
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The application of the probability of error factor-abuse of
discretion or issues of first impression--once again depends
upon the specific facts of the lower court ruling. For example,
when a judge summarily closes a trial without stating a reason
and without allowing the public to intervene, an abuse of dis-
cretion clearly exists, subjecting the order to possible immedi-
ate appeal. 37 It may not, however, be necessary to discuss the
probability of error factor because closed proceedings may well
qualify for appeal by the public under the third factor-collat-
erality. It is well settled that the erroneous closure of a criminal
proceeding is not a ground for reversing a judgment and forcing
the parties to go through a new, open trial when a non-party is
protesting the closure. 38 Thus, because the public and the me-
dia may not seek review at trial's end from an order closing a
criminal proceeding, 39 if the defendant is acquitted, they have
lost forever their right to attend that proceeding. Moreover,
even when the defendant is convicted, the public or the media
must rely upon the defendant or the state to appeal the closure
motion. If the conviction is not overturned, the right to attend
the proceeding is lost if the proceeding was closed in error. For
these reasons, courts should adopt a general rule granting the
public an immediate appeal of a closure order when the signifi-
cance of the underlying public interest is established.40
ing important or significant There are many rights which are not explicitly in-
cluded in the Constitution, but which over time have come to be regarded as
included or as properly protected. Second, the rights or interests affected
under a collateral order such as this one need not be as significant as where a
reversal and a new trial are possible upon review at trial's end. Finally, one
commentator has argued that "[a] dual system under which ordinary proceed-
ings are open to the public while parts of those that most excite public concern
are hidden from view would undermine the ritual role of the trial," and
"[s]uppression hearings, for example, present the chief opportunity for the
public to scrutinize police conduct regarding searches and confessions." Note,
Trial Secrecy and the First Amendment Right of Public Access to Judicial Pro-
ceedings, 91 HARv. L REV. 1899, 1909 (1978). Such concerns are recognized in
court rules such as Mnm. R. CanM. P. 25.01, which authorizes an immediate ap-
peal from an order closing a pretrial hearing. Therefore, the general rule
should be that the public's right to attend any type of proceding is generally
sufficient to warrant consideration of the other two factors in the test.
137. See, e.g., Hearst Corp. v. Cholakis, 54 A.D.2d 592, 593, 386 N.Y.S.2d 892,
893 (1976) (court granted closure after hearing conducted with only "defend-
ants, their attorneys and court personnel present," and without considering
"any facts that might have shown the presence of 'unusual circumstances'").
138. See generally Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814,
2821 (1980).
139. See Commercial Printing Co. v. Lee, 262 Ark. 87, 87 n.2, 553 S.W.2d 270,
272 n.2 (1977); State ex rel. Beacon Journal v. Kainrad, 46 Ohio St. 2d 349, 355,
348 N.E.2d 695, 699 (1976).




Although in theory it might make a difference which excep-
tion to the final judgment rule is invoked, in practice the ques-
tion of whether an interlocutory order is appealable depends
more on the facts and circumstances of the individual case
than on whether the order falls properly into one rule or an-
other. Under the prevailing traditional approach, sympathetic
judges can find a way to fit a case within an exception to the
final judgment rule and thus can hear the appeal, while strict
constructionists of the rule can ignore even the most finely
framed exception. The present system of determining appeala-
bility has thus reached a point where the parties, the courts,
and the public do not understand when an issue should be
granted an immediate appeal. Attempts by the Supreme Court
and commentators to provide a more uniform test have failed,
primarily because they have not been specific enough to offer
appellate courts the guidance they need.
This Note has demonstrated that the final judgment rule
and its exceptions can be reduced to a consideration of three
factors-the significance of the rights or interests adversely af-
fected by the order, the probability of error on the part of the
lower court, and the collaterality of the issue to the merits. The
test derived in the analysis suggests that, as a general rule,
whenever both the first test and one of the latter two tests is
met, the appellate court should grant an immediate appeal. In
applying these factors to closure orders, it becomes apparent
that they provide a valuable framework for making appealabil-
ity determinations. The factors appear to structure most of the
discretion of the appellate courts while allowing flexibility for
difficult cases and providing the opportunity to elaborate upon
those factors that courts have generally considered only implic-
itly.
papers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814, 2825 (1980). See also, Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 547-55 (1976); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333,
349 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 557-64 (1965) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
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